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Abstract
Logically centralized nature of the controller in Software-deﬁned Networking (SDN) makes it vulnerable to various adversarial
attacks. These attacks have capabilities to degrade the performance of the managed network or bring it down in the worst case.
For this reason, a large-scale deployment of SDN needs evaluation of the impact of adversarial attacks on network services. In this
work, we implement various attacks in SDN and analyze their impact on the performance of web-based services running over it.
Prior to that, we brieﬂy discuss diﬀerent kinds of vulnerabilities and threats in SDN. We consider the connection set-up latency
and loss, for web-client requests, as metrics for the evaluation. We observe a signiﬁcant degradation in the performances of web
services, in terms of response time and availability, in the presence of implemented attacks.
c© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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Engineering (SCSE 2015).
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1. Introduction
Software-Deﬁned Networking (SDN), originated from research in academia, now became a signiﬁcant topic of
discussion among the network service providers, operators, and equipment vendors. In the SDN architecture, the
control logic and the data logic are decoupled from network devices, unlike the traditional network architecture. The
control plane is consolidated to a logically centralized controller. It keeps the global view of the entire network and
makes it programmable using software applications running on top of it. The network devices termed as switches,
become ﬂexible in functionality. They can be programmed to function as switches, routers, or ﬁrewalls using diﬀerent
network applications implemented on the controller platform7.
SDN oﬀers several advantages to the network operators, administrators, and researchers over traditional networks.
It makes distributed network decision problems, e.g. routing, to the logically centralized one. In addition, it provides
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an abstraction of the managed network to the controller applications. These two features make the network man-
agement easier in an SDN environment. A centralized network policy, implemented without any low-level network
devices conﬁgurations, can manage the network eﬃciently. SDN brings an advancement towards network innovation.
A researcher can implement a prototype application on the controller and observe its impact on a large portion of the
network without aﬀecting the production traﬃc. It aims to reduce the timespan of transition of a prototype to the
real-world deployment. This is in contrast to the traditional ossiﬁed network architecture where it takes a decade in
this transition12. Within a couple of years from its inception, SDN has found many use cases in the networking world
including traﬃc engineering, mobility and wireless, network monitoring, and data-center networking7.
SDN is envisaged as a great promise for the future Internet. Nevertheless, it has to address several issues to make it
widely accepted for the real-world deployment. Security is one of the most important issues that has to be taken into
consideration at ﬁrst hand. This overemphasis on the security comes from the fact that in the last few decades, we have
witnessed an unprecedented increase in the system vulnerabilities and threats. Various network security applications
and frameworks are proposed using SDN. However, the security of the SDN itself has never been paid attention in
much detail as compared to other research work in this area. A few literatures have discussed various threat vectors
and their mitigation in a limited domain. We discuss them brieﬂy in Section 5.
In contrast to the previous work, we believe that it is also important to evaluate the impact on the network services
running over the SDN managed networks under adversarial attacks. Are the network providers/operators able to meet
the customers Service Level Agreement (SLA) in the presence of the attacks? Availability of the network services to
the customers and their response time are the critical components in any network service SLAs. With this motivation,
we aim to model various attacks speciﬁc to the SDN and evaluate the impact on the performance of the network
services.
Towards this end, our paper is organized as follows. We present an overview of the SDN architecture in Section 2.
Section 3 discusses various vulnerabilities in SDN. In Section 4, we discuss the attacks that we choose, methodologies
to implement them, and evaluate the performance of network services under those attacks. Finally, we conclude our
paper with an insight for the future work in Section 6.
2. Overview of SDN Architecture
The controller is the core of the system in SDN managed networks. It runs on a dedicated or distributed server(s),
however, logically centralized. Every switch is connected to the controller through a TCP connection. The connection
is either TLS/SSL encrypted or plain and forms the control channel of SDN. The controller communicates with
switches using an open API. Currently, OpenFlow is a de facto standard protocol which provides an interface for the
controller-switch communication19.
Flow tables reside inside every switch for handling network ﬂows. A ﬂow in SDN is deﬁned as a set of packets
with similar values for certain header ﬁelds. These ﬂow tables consist of ﬂow rules that are installed by the controller
based on the network applications running over it. Flow rules can be installed by the controller either in reactive mode
or proactive mode20. In the reactive ﬂow installation, whenever a packet arrives for an upcoming ﬂow at a switch,
a match is performed against the ﬂow rules inside the ﬂow tables. If there is a match found inside the tables then
an action is taken accordingly as speciﬁed in the tables corresponding to the matched rule. These actions can either
be forward, drop or set. If a miss happens for the ﬂow, a packet in event message is forwarded to the controller
from the switch. This message encapsulates the packet headers for the missed ﬂow. The controller examines the
packet headers for the ﬂow in the message. Based on the network applications policies, the controller either sends a
packet out or a flow mod message to the switch for the ﬂow.
In response to flow mod message, ﬂow rules are installed on switches for the upcoming ﬂow. The subsequent
packets for the same ﬂow can then be directly processed inside the switches instead of forwarding them again to the
controller. Figure 1 shows the traﬃc ﬂow in the SDN architecture in reactive mode. In order to manage the memory
size of ﬂow tables, ﬂow rules expire after certain timeout events. For a packet out message, no ﬂow rule is installed
inside the ﬂow tables. The packet is forwarded to a single port or broadcast to all ports of the switch depends on the
network policies.
On the other hand, in case of proactive ﬂow installation, the controller pre-installs ﬂow rules for all kinds of ﬂows
that could come into the switches instead of reacting to every packet.
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Fig. 1: Basic SDN architecture and traﬃc ﬂow in reactive mode ﬂow
installation 13.
Fig. 2: Various attack scenarios implemented for web service perfor-
mance analysis. The data plane attack includes controller, switch1,
switch2, web hosts, and attacker hosts. The channel spooﬁng attack in-
cludes controller, switch1, malicious switch, and web hosts of switch1.
3. Security Challenges in SDN
Security challenges in SDN are more threatening for the managed networks as compared to the traditional networks.
In a traditional network, targets are only a few servers or a portion of the network. On the contrary, if an SDN is
compromised by some adversaries the whole managed network will be endangered. Various vulnerabilities and threats
have been discussed in1,8,15. However, for the sake of completeness, we provide a brief discussion of vulnerabilities
and threats in SDN from the following aspects:
3.1. SDN Management Threats
SDN management includes set-up of switches and controllers, installation of network applications, administering
controllers, managing credentials between various entities of the SDN. Albeit, the complexity of compromising SDN
management is high as it needs authentication. However, If it gets compromised, the eﬀect on the network is severe.
Various security threats can occur in the management. A malicious administrator can misconﬁgure network policies
which might degrade the performance of the managed network or can bring it down in the worst case. An unauthorized
network application, comes from a third-party, could contain a malicious code. The restriction on applications to
access the controller server or the underlying managed network is very less in SDN. Therefore, a malicious code
can manipulate various conﬁgurations on the controller server, shut it down or crash it down once the malware gets
installed on it. Installation of faulty or malicious switches can deter the SDN to perform intended tasks in accordance
to the network policies.
3.2. Control Plane Threats
Control plane includes network applications policies and signalling traﬃc between switches and the controller
for administering the managed network. In SDN, network applications policies can contradict each other. Lack of
their prioritization leads to an unexpected behaviour of the managed network. For example, the set action modiﬁes
the ﬂow rules inside the ﬂow tables. This action can be used for honeypot, quarantine a host, or captive portals
application. However, a malicious application can exploit this action to bypass the ﬁrewall policies implemented by
other applications through modiﬁcation of ﬂow headers.
According to the OpenFlow speciﬁcation, the communication channel between the controller and the switch may
be TLS/SSL encrypted or plain. It is observed that many switch vendors and controllers lack in the implementation of
encrypted channels1. They adopt a plain TCP-based communication channel. It is not a concern for secure networks.
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However, if the signalling traﬃc is carried out via an insecure channel, a man-in-the-middle attack can be launched
easily. It can happen in the case of Software-Deﬁned Mobile Networks (SDMN), campus Wi-Fi networks, or traﬃc
passes through adversarial networks.
Furthermore, a malicious switch with the datapath identity of a genuine switch can cause disconnection of the
genuine switch from the network and can lead to the disruption of the traﬃc from the switch4. Apart from that, a
faulty malicious switch can generate too many fake packet in requests to the controller to consume the controller
resources. This makes the controller less available to handle the genuine ﬂow requests.
3.3. Data Plane Threats
End user devices, switch ﬂow tables, and the traﬃc passing through them form the data plane. As mentioned in
Section 2, for a ﬂow table miss event, the packet is forwarded to the controller for ﬂow rule installation in the switch.
Therefore, the response time of the ﬁrst packet in a ﬂow is, in general, longer as compared to the subsequent packets
of the ﬂow in SDN. This characteristic of SDN helps an adversary from the data plane to ﬁngerprint it 17. In addition,
it helps adversaries to ﬁnd out ﬂows for which there is no ﬂow rule installation in the ﬂow tables and the controller
sends packet outmessages to handle them. The adversaries can send these ﬂows to overwhelm the controller. These
fake ﬂows keep the controller busy in handling them and occupy the memory of a switch in buﬀering them as well
until they get responses from the controller. This leads in the degradation of the network performance.
4. Attacks Implementation and Impact Analysis
In our attack analysis experiments, we implemented those attacks for which there is no requirement of any kind
of authentication to access an SDN system. From this perspective, we choose the data plane attack and the control
channel spooﬁng. In the ﬁrst attack, we send fake requests, from adversaries in the data plane, to keep the controller
and switches busy to handle them and cause delay and loss in ﬂow set-up of genuine traﬃc. In the second attack, a
malicious switch spoofs the identity of a genuine switch and causes it to be disconnected from the controller. Figure 2
shows our overall attack scenarios for both cases. We evaluate the impact of these attacks on connection set-up
latency and loss of web clients requests to servers. With the growth of web-based businesses, the network operators
must conﬁrm various service-level agreements (SLA) to their web customers. Service availability and response-time
are two of the critical metrics in any SLA. We account these metrics by measuring the connection set-up latency and
loss. In the following subsections, we discuss these attacks implementation and their impact on web services.
4.1. Data Plane Attack
We use mininet emulator9 and POX controller2 to implement the data plane attack. Mininet is an SDN emulator,
implemented using network namespace feature of Linux and Open vSwitch. We can create as many virtual hosts and
OpenFlow based switches as we need on a single host using mininet. The virtual hosts can emulate all network
functionalities and run various network services independent of other virtual hosts. Switches can be connected to
a controller running either on the same host or a remote host. Although mininet has some performance ﬁdelity
issues while emulating a large number of virtual hosts and switches and developed mainly for rapid-prototyping of
SDN application, we can get an insight about the attack impacts on the services. POX is a Python-based controller
that provides a platform for rapid deployment of network applications for SDN. We modiﬁed the l2 learning
application, a self-learning ethernet switch module available in POX, for our experiments. The modiﬁed application
installs ﬂow rules inside the ﬂow tables of switches for web-based traﬃc only. It generates packet out event for other
traﬃc. The ﬂow timeout is set to 15s. If a ﬂow set-up request does not arrive at switches within this timeout period,
the ﬂow rules evict from ﬂow tables. As a genuine traﬃc, a client sends a web request to the server after a regular
interval. We set the interval of request less than the timeout of ﬂow rules in switches in one case and greater than it
in another case. We use curl utility at clients side to measure the response time of the server3. We set maximum
connection timeout to 60s for a client request to a server. After this timeout, the request is considered as lost.
We carried out our experiments on virtual machines (VMs) created over VMWare ESXi host. This host runs on
Dell PowerEdge 2950 server with Intel Xeon CPU E5420 @ 2.50 GHz and 16GB RAM. There are 8 CPU cores
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Fig. 3: Average connection set-up latency and loss when all hosts
reside in the same network.
Fig. 4: Average connection set-up latency and loss when web hosts
and adversaries reside in diﬀerent networks.
with 2.493 GHz. We run the same set of experiments on four VMs, each with conﬁguration of 4GB RAM and
4 core CPUs. For our ﬁnal result, we take the average of all runs. On each VM, we run the POX controller with
the modiﬁed l2 learning module. We created 2 switches and virtual hosts for web hosts and adversaries using
mininet, which are in turn connected with the controller. The link-speed and delay between controller-to-switch and
switch-to-switch are 10Mbps and 1ms. However, we keep the link-speed and delay between host-to-switch 1Mbps
and 1ms, respectively. In order to have a good estimation of the attack, we connected 10 web client-server pairs with
switches. These clients send 20 requests to their corresponding server after a regular interval as mentioned above.
We consider ping ﬂooding for the adversarial attacks. The adversarial hosts are part of the network and work in a
distributed manner as in the case of botnets. An adversary sends ping traﬃc to its peer adversary. We varied the ping
frequency interval during our experiments and studied the impact on web services. We consider four attack scenarios
based on the locations of the client-server (web hosts) and adversaries. These scenarios are as follows:
4.1.1. Intra-switch communication on the same network
Web hosts and adversaries reside on the same network. As an example in Figure 2, all hosts are connected to
switch1. We observe from Figure 3 that connection set-up latency is quite high when client requests are sent after
the timeout period of ﬂow rules in the switch as compared to when they are sent before the timeout period. In the
former case, the connection set-up latency increased upto 22s with the attack frequency of 14kps, where in the later
case it went upto 3s. The loss fraction in both cases increases with increased attack frequencies. However, in the ﬁrst
case, it is higher as compared to the second case, reached upto 98%. The reason for the high loss rate, still in the
case when requests are generated before ﬂow rules timeout period in the switch, is due to the large number of ping
ﬂooding packets from adversaries cause memory buﬀer overﬂow in the switch for queuing the incoming packets from
the hosts.
4.1.2. Intra-switch communication on diﬀerent networks
Web hosts and adversaries reside on diﬀerent networks. As an example in Figure 2, web hosts and adversaries are
associated with switch1 and switch2, respectively. As is evident from Figure 4 that the attack impact is insigniﬁcant.
We observed that the loss remains around 5% most of the time and the latency is low even with increased attack fre-
quencies in both cases. It went upto 0.11s and 0.06s for requests generated after and before the timeout, respectively.
The reason for less impact is that only the controller and the adversaries side switch is aﬀected by the attack. Flow
tables and memory buﬀers for queuing the incoming packets in the switch and the control link from the switch to the
controller on the web hosts side did not get overwhelmed with unwanted packet in requests of the ping ﬂoods.
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Fig. 5: Average connection set-up latency and loss when web hosts
reside on the same network and adversaries located on diﬀerent
networks.
Fig. 6: Average connection set-up latency and loss when web hosts
and adversaries span on diﬀerent networks.
4.1.3. Intra-switch and inter-switch communication
In this scenario, web hosts are associated with switch1while adversaries are associated with both switches as shown
in Figure 2. We observed from Figure 5 that the result for this scenario is similar to the ﬁrst attack scenario with less
severity. An explanation for this is as adversaries are distributed, ﬂow tables and memory buﬀers in web hosts side
switch and the control link of it with the controller are less occupied with ﬂow requests as compared to the ﬁrst attack
scenario.
4.1.4. Inter-switch communication
Web hosts and adversaries both have inter-switch communication. As an example in Figure 2, clients are associated
with switch1 and servers are associated with switch2. Adversaries are associated with both switches. As is evident
from Figure 6, the attack is the most severe of all. This attack consumes the controller resources, overﬂows switches
memory buﬀers and ﬂow tables, and overwhelms all control links. Connection set-up latencies increased upto 52s
even in the case when requests are sent before the ﬂow rule timeout of switches which gives a notion that ﬂow rules
are evicted due to large packet in requests for adversarial DoS ﬂows. Connection loss saturation occurred at only
6kps when the requests are sent after the ﬂow rule time out in switches.
4.2. Control Channel Spooﬁng
We exploit the switch datapath identity vulnerability in the attack4 as mentioned in Section 4. With the lack of
implementation of TLS/SSL encryption in the control channel, an adversary can easily ﬁnd out information about
switches in the network and use this information to spoof switches in the SDN managed network. To implement
this attack, we ran an OpenFlow-based open vSwitch on a host and connected this host with the POX controller on
a remote host. We used the same modiﬁed l2 learning module with the timeout interval of 30s. We created 20
virtual hosts using network namespace and connected them with the switch. These virtual hosts form client-server
pairs for web application. We performed the same connection set-up latency and loss experiments as we did previously.
We ran another OpenFlow-based switch to function it like a malicious switch on another host. When the switch is
connected with the controller, we establish a connection for the malicious switch, with the same IP address of the
genuine switch, with the controller. This causes disconnection of the genuine switch and connection of the malicious
switch with the controller, alternatively. Therefore, end devices that were associated with genuine switch suﬀer a
connection disruption in the network. We automated the connection-disconnection set-up of the malicious switch
with the controller after a speciﬁed interval. We varied the interval from 2s to 22s. The genuine switch automatically
attempts to connect with the controller upon disconnection. Clients generate requests at an interval greater than and
less than the ﬂow-rule timeout period in the switch. Figure 7 and 8 show the result for connection set-up latency
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Fig. 7: Average connection set-up latency with varying spooﬁng
interval of the malicious switch
Fig. 8: Average loss with varying spooﬁng interval of the mali-
cious switch
and loss fraction for all the clients. We did not observe any pattern for the connection set-up latency; however, the
latency is high as compared to the case when there is no switch spooﬁng. The eﬀect on the loss fraction is signiﬁcant
in this attack. We observed that the loss rate for the client connection is high when the interval for malicious switch
connection is small. The loss rate went upto 98%. It is due to the fact that connection-disconnection of a malicious
switch with small interval restricts the genuine switch to connect with the controller most of the time. With the
increase of spooﬁng interval, the loss fraction decreased.
With a comparison to the data plane attack, launching this attack would be easier. Nonetheless, the assumption
is the control channel is insecure. In the data plane attack, the adversaries have to ﬁnd out the ﬂows for which the
controller does not set-up ﬂow-rules in the ﬂow tables of switches. On the other hand, in this attack adversaries
need only information about the IP addresses of switches and the controller. With the spooﬁng of few switches, the
performance of network services would be highly degraded.
5. Related Work
Various challenges were discussed for large-scale deployment of SDN including security, performance, scalability,
and inter-operability of SDN with traditional networks in15. Threats in SDN have been categorized into seven vectors
in8. Out of these, three vectors are speciﬁc to SDN including controller vulnerabilities, lack of trust between the
controller and applications, and attack on the administrator host. Security analysis and modelling methodologies were
presented for SDN, using the STRIDE and attack tree approach, uncover vulnerabilities in SDN in7. A survey on
security using SDN and security of SDN, itself, were presented in14.
A few work have been started to address the security challenges of SDN. A framework for developing various
security applications over SDN is proposed in16. In addition, it has a provision for resolving conﬂicts among ﬂow rules
installation between various network applications. This restricts bypassing of ﬁrewall rules of a security application by
a non-security application. A robust ﬁrewall application has been proposed through checking ﬂow space and ﬁrewall
authorization space in5,21. It accounts the intra-table ﬂow rules dependencies in switches for rule-conﬂict detection.
An extension to OpenFlow data plane has been proposed in order to reduce the control-data plane interaction during
adversarial attacks in18. This reduces the load on the controller for handling large ﬂow requests from switches.
However, the extension works around only for TCP-based ﬂow requests. A secure control channel architecture has
been proposed for SDMN using Host Identity Protocol (HIP) in10. A controller architecture to defend the SDN
from malicious administrator problems has been proposed in11. To restrict the access of network applications to the
controller system and the managed network, a ﬁne grained permission system has been proposed for applications in22.
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6. Conclusion
In this work, we evaluated the impact on the performance of network services running over SDN under adversarial
attacks. The impact evaluation of various attacks gives an insight for the risk analysis of them and enables us to
calculate the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) corresponding to these attacks. We found that web
service performances, in terms of response time and availability, get highly degraded in the presence of attacks. The
adverse eﬀects on the response time and availability pose great challenges for the operators to meet SLA for their
customers. For the future work, more attacks and network services including VoIP, video streaming deployed in a
real SDN testbed can be considered for attack analysis. An overall risk evaluation for various threats can also be
presented by evaluating the impacts of them on SDN managed networks. Although our attack implementation was
based on certain assumptions, many organizations lack in imposing security policies for their networks and make
these assumptions valid6. SDN has great future and capabilities to bring a revolution in network industries as well as
in research. However, for a wide acceptance, it has to devise solutions to overcome security threats.
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